Vladimir Putin Admits He’s In Love

In order to curry favor with Putin, Gerasimov ordered a famous painter to create a large oil painting called “Putin is in Love”.

When the painting was unveiled, everyone was stunned: the picture showed two men in the trenches, snuggling up to each other, and the body of another man lying next to it.

Gerasimov asked angrily: “Who are these two men?”

The painter replied: “It was the soldier responsible for the attack on Pokrovsk.”

Gerasimov asked again: “What about this one lying on the ground!?”

The painter replied: “It was their comrade-in-arms who had just died.”

Gerasimov roared: “Where is Putin?”

The painter replied calmly: “Putin is in love.”

Putin said at his annual press conference that he is in love

On December 19, 2025, Putin admitted at his annual press conference that he was in a relationship. During this four-and-a-half-hour choreographed event, a female reporter from Russia’s 360 TV, Regina Orekhova, asked: “You said today that you believe in the existence of love at first sight, Mr. Vladimir, are you in love?” Putin replied briefly: “Yes.”

Although Putin did not disclose the details of his romantic interest, the 73-year-old Russian president is believed to have been in a relationship with former Olympic gymnast Alina Kabaeva for 18 years. The couple is rumored to have two children, aged 10 and 6, under the pseudonyms Ivan Spirodonov and Vladimir Spirodonov.

Putin and Lyudmila Putina announced their peaceful divorce on June 6, 2013 after watching a ballet performance in the Kremlin, and their marriage lasted for 30 years.

Overview of the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war

After the 2014 Square Revolution, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, inciting and supporting pro-Russian forces in the Donbas region to launch an armed rebellion against the Ukrainian government.

Between 2015 and 2021, small-scale armed conflicts continued to occur.

From October to December 2019, a non-surrender movement broke out in Ukraine to protest the government’s compromise on the Donbas region.

Beginning in March 2021, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a presidential decree to recapture the Donbas region and inspected the front line.

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion, leading to a significant escalation of the conflict.

In 2024, Ukraine launched an offensive against Kursk Oblast in Russia, and the war has been deadlocked since then.

As of early 2025, the war has caused more than 100 casualties among Russian soldiers.**

In the trenches**

Soldier A: “Do you know? Putin talked.”

Soldier B: “Finally peace talks? You can go home!”

Soldier A: “He is in love.”

Ordinary soldiers are consumed as consumables on the battlefield, while the Russian president is in love.

Russia’s economic development since 2014

2014 was a watershed moment in Russia’s contemporary economic history. The Ukraine crisis that broke out that year triggered the first round of systematic sanctions by Western countries, and at the same time, the sharp collapse of international oil prices (plummeting from more than $100 per barrel to less than $50) formed a double blow to Russia’s fiscal and monetary system. The core characteristics of this period were slowing economic growth, sharp currency depreciation, and the initial establishment of a defensive fiscal framework.

Macroeconomic slowdown and recession

Between 2014 and 2018, Russia’s output growth was significantly weaker than its emerging market counterparts. The data shows that the average real GDP growth rate over the past five years was only 0.5%, about 2 percentage points lower than originally expected. In 2015, the Russian economy recorded a significant contraction of 2.0%, which directly reflects the combined consequences of sanctions and oil price shocks. Although the economy bottomed out in the second quarter of 2016 and began a slow recovery, it was not until the second quarter of 2018 that it returned to pre-crisis levels.

Sharp adjustments in monetary policy and exchange rate fluctuations

In response to capital outflows and inflationary pressures, the Central Bank of Russia took extremely aggressive measures at the end of 2014, significantly raising the benchmark interest rate to 17% and deciding to abandon the ruble’s target exchange rate range in favor of a free-floating exchange rate system. Although this move led to a sharp depreciation of the ruble against the US dollar, it successfully played the role of a “shock absorber” to help the budget maintain ruble-denominated revenue levels in a low oil price environment. In 2014, Russia’s net outflow of private capital reached $518.4 billion, accounting for 2.79% of GDP.

Fiscal rules and the restructuring of the national wealth fund

To reduce the budget’s reliance on volatile oil revenues, the Russian government has tightened its fiscal rules during this period. This rule stipulates that when actual oil prices exceed the set “benchmark price,” excess revenue will be automatically transferred to the National Wealth Fund (NWF). This mechanism played a key role in 2018, when the budget achieved a surplus of 2.9%, mainly due to a recovery in oil prices and strong performance in non-oil and gas revenues.

Table 1: Main macroeconomic indicators of Russia from 2014 to 2018

Data sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Federal Statistical Service of the Russian Federation (Rosstat)

The changes in the lives of the Russian people since the Russian-Ukrainian war

Since the start of the “special military operation” on February 24, 2022, Russian society has undergone the most profound structural changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Against the backdrop of unprecedented Western sanctions, large-scale domestic military mobilization, and the full tilt of national resources towards the defense industry, the living standards of the Russian people have shown an extremely contradictory development trend. This phenomenon is called the “two-speed economy” by economists, that is, sectors and classes directly related to the war have achieved a short-term surge in income, while the broad civilian economy, middle class and public service system have slowly degraded due to hyperinflation and resource depletion.

The divergence between the macroeconomic boom and the actual income of residents

The resilience of the Russian economy in the early days of the war exceeded the expectations of many Western observers. After experiencing a 2.1% contraction in 2022 (a figure much lower than the initial forecast of a recession of 8.5%-11.2%), the Russian economy achieved growth of 3.6% and 4.3% in 2023 and 2024, respectively. However, this growth does not stem from productivity gains or technological innovation, but rather from Military Keynesianism driven by state-led military spending.

It is estimated that Russia’s daily war costs between $500 million and $10 billion. As of June 2024, direct military spending has reached $2500 billion, accounting for more than 20% of GDP. In addition, more than $2000 billion in extrabudgetary financing flows to defense contractors and war-related companies through preferential bank loans.

Wartime macroeconomic indicator system

According to data from the World Bank, the Bank of Russia, and the International Monetary Fund, although the total GDP is growing, the economic environment perceived by residents is extremely unstable. Inflationary pressures and high financing costs are eroding the dividends of growth.

Table 2: Wartime macroeconomic core indicators from 2022 to 2026

Data sources: World Bank, Central Bank of Russia, IMF, Trading Economics, Wikipedia

Key findings:

• The benchmark interest rate reached a record high of 21% in 2024, the highest level since 2014 by the Bank of Russia
• Although nominal wages increased by 19% in 2024, real purchasing power was severely damaged by inflation
• GDP growth forecasts show a sharp slowdown in the economy in 2025-2026, from 4.3% to 0.8-1.5%

Structural injustice and polarization of revenue growth

Under the influence of “military Keynesianism”, Russia’s income distribution has undergone a drastic rebalancing. Although nominal wage growth reached a 16-year high (19%) at the end of 2024, this boom is limited to specific groups. Wages for military factory workers have surged by 30% to 60% due to labor shortages, while contracted soldiers and their families have received unprecedented “death dividends” and subsidies.

However, for workers in non-war-related industries, pensioners, and public sector employees, who account for 80% of the population, real purchasing power is stagnating or even declining. Although the official inflation rate remains around 8-9%, the perceived inflation rate by residents has exceeded 12-16%. This has led to further division of social classes: a small percentage of the population benefiting from the war is engaging in retaliatory consumption, while a third of Russians say they have faced economic difficulties in buying food in the past year.

Soaring Food Prices: The Potato Crisis and the Butter Theft

Between 2024 and 2025, Russia experienced a severe food price crisis. The most symbolic of these is the skyrocketing potato prices.

Amazing increase in potato prices

According to data from the Federal Statistical Service of the Russian Federation (Rosstat):

• As of early May 2025, the average retail price of potatoes reached 84.7 rubles (about $1.07) per kilogram
• This is an increase of 183% from 30 rubles in May 2024, marking the highest increase since records began in 2002
• In some regions, supermarket prices even exceed 100-200 rubles ($1.20-2.53) per kilogram
• On an annual basis, potato prices in May 2025 will increase by 173% compared to the same period last year

This increase has made Russia the most expensive market for wholesale potatoes in the world. According to data from agricultural analysis company AB-Center, by early April 2025, wholesale prices will increase by 285.5% year-on-year, from 11.4 rubles ($0.14) per kilogram to 42.4 rubles ($0.53, excluding VAT). In comparison, the global average price is about 17 euro cents (about 15.5 rubles) per kilogram.

The deep causes of the potato crisis

1. Significant reduction in acreage: Farmers are turning to more profitable oil crops and sugar beets due to low prices due to record-breaking harvests in 2023. Acreage has dropped significantly in 2024.

2. Severe weather impact: The Urals and Siberia experienced rain, frost and flooding, and extreme heat in summer. Russia produced 730 tons of potatoes in 2024, a decrease of 120 tons from the previous year.

3. Seed import dependence: Russia relies heavily on imported seeds. Seed imports fell 2.5 times in 2024, with domestic seeds accounting for only 68% of the market. According to a report by the Russian Grain Union, only 16% of potato fields will use Russian seeds in 2025, compared to only 2.2% in 2024.

4. Insufficient storage facilities: Storage losses account for about 15% of the harvest, about 120 tons. There is a shortage of storage facilities, and existing facilities are often of substandard quality. In addition, potatoes lose quality when they are infested by pests such as stem nematodes.

5. Labor shortage: According to the estimate of Agriculture Minister Oksana Lut, there is a shortage of about 20 people in the agricultural labor force.

Putin admitted that there was a shortage of potatoes

On May 27, 2025, President Putin publicly acknowledged the shortage of potatoes in Russia in a teleconference: “Yesterday (Monday), I met with representatives of various business sectors, including agriculture. It turned out that we did not have enough potatoes. I spoke with Alexander Grigorievich Lukashenko. He said, ‘We have sold everything to Russia.’”

The day before, Lukashenko’s press office joked that additional potatoes had been grown in Belarus. Belarusians have been complaining about the poor quality and limited supply of potatoes in stores for several months.

Other food prices have risen

In addition to potatoes, the prices of other basic foods have also risen significantly. According to data from November 2024:

• The price of butter has risen by more than 30%, leading to news cases of butter theft in supermarkets
• Red beet prices rose by 94%
• Onion prices increased by 87.2% (up to 72.3 rubles per kg)
• The price of cabbage increased by 56.8% (up to 75.2 rubles per kg)
• The prices of apples, tomatoes, carrots, etc. have all increased by at least 15%
• Olive oil, red beet and cabbage rose by about 30%
• Red onions rose more than 40%

Food inflation remained above 9% in October 2024, despite several government interventions.

Government response

In response to the crisis, the Kremlin has taken urgent measures:

1. Eliminate the 5% import tariff on potatoes
2. Approved duty-free imports of up to 15 tons, and plans to double the duty-free quota when prices remain high
3. In 2025, Russian potato imports increased 3.5 times, and by spring, foreign potatoes will account for 30-40% of the stocks of large retail chains, compared to an annual average of only 10%
4. Main import sources: Egypt, China, Pakistan, Turkey, Israel, Belarus (also facing shortages this year), Azerbaijan, Georgia, and even Mongolia

However, these measures have had limited effectiveness. Agriculture Minister Oksana Lut predicts that prices should begin to fall in July, when this year’s harvest will begin. But she also acknowledged that many factors depend on variables such as weather.

Impact on people’s livelihood

Russia has one of the highest per capita potato consumption countries in the world, so rising prices have had a huge impact on people’s lives:

• According to the Development Center of the Higher School of Economics, Russians bought 8% fewer potatoes in the first quarter of 2025 compared to the same period last year
• In contrast, sales of bread, pasta, and cereals increased by 6%, 5%, and 3%, respectively, indicating a clear trend among consumers to replace vegetables with cheaper products
• The average consumer’s ability to buy potatoes has dropped by nearly 45% compared to last year

For Tatyana, a 72-year-old resident of the city of Kirov, she now spends two-thirds of her pension on food purchases, compared to about half before. “Basic foods such as milk, butter, eggs and bread are at least twice as expensive as last year,” she said.

Extreme tightening of the labor market and loss of human capital

Russia is in the midst of the worst labor shortage in history, with the unemployment rate falling to a post-Soviet low of 2.1%. This phenomenon is not a sign of economic prosperity but a product of the collapse of the labor supply side.

Population loss and talent gap

Since 2022, an estimated 65 to 100 labor force members have left Russia, most of whom are highly educated IT, financial, medical and academic professionals. According to the OutRush research project:

• About a quarter of these immigrants already speak or are actively learning the language of their destination country
• Two-thirds joined international or local companies
• Main flows: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Israel (8 people), the United States (4.8 people), Germany (3.6 people) and Serbia (more than 3 people)

At the same time, hundreds of thousands of men of school age were sent to the battlefield:

• 30 people were mobilized and sent to the front line
• About 50 people signed a contract with the Ministry of National Defense to participate in the war
• The war has caused more than 100 casualties

This further drained the civilian sector’s labor reserves.

The size of the labor gap

At the end of 2024, the Russian economy faces a staffing gap of up to 260 to 310:

• The manufacturing industry is short of about 39.1 workers
• The trade sector has a shortfall of 34.7 million
• The transportation industry has a shortage of 21.9 million

The Russian Academy of Sciences predicts:

• By 2030, the labor gap will reach 240 to 480 people
• In the worst case, it could be as high as 11 million

Impact on productivity

This crunch has set off a significant ripple effect:

• Due to the lack of qualified technicians, although Russia’s industrial capacity utilization rate has reached a high of 84%, productivity is declining
• Companies have had to drastically reduce hiring requirements and raise wages to retain talent
• Businesses are turning to hire retirees and inexperienced young people
• This downgrade of human capital will have a devastating impact on Russia’s long-term development potential, further lagging behind the global level in the technological competition

The decline of migrant workers and the pressure of social security

The construction and retail industries, traditionally dependent on Central Asian immigrants, also face difficulties:

As of mid-2025, there are about 450 Central Asian immigrants in Russia:

• There are about 210 Uzbeks
• Tajiks are about 120
• There are about 70 Kyrgyz people
• There are about 40 Kazakhs
• Turkmens are about 10 thousand

However, with the depreciation of the ruble and the tightening of Russia’s immigration policies (especially after the March 2024 terrorist attack on the hall of the city of Crocus):

• In 2024, the number of migrants entering Russia decreased by about 20 compared to 2022
• Increased the artificial shortage in the labor market by 10%
• This shortage has driven up infrastructure costs and led to a decline in the quality of urban services
• It has sparked hatred and social friction against immigrants

The “cannon vs. butter” battle under the resource trade-off

Russia’s state budgets for 2025 and 2026 clearly demonstrate the strategic shift of national resources from civilian livelihood to the military. This trade-off, known as “cannon and butter,” is coming at the expense of the quality of public services.

The militarization of the public budget

In 2026, defense and security spending plus debt interest will account for as much as 46% of the Russian Federation’s budget, while medical, education and environmental spending combined will account for only 5%. This means that every ruble invested in war is deducted from schools, hospitals and infrastructure maintenance.

In 2024, defense spending has reached 10.78 trillion rubles, accounting for 29.4% of total spending, more than double that of 2022.

Table 3: Distribution of budget expenditure in the Russian Federation for 2026

數據來源: OSW (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich)、Euromaidan Press

The collapse of local finances and the downgrading of services

The federal government has delegated a lot of social support responsibilities and conscription costs to local governments, but the growth of central funding is much lower than inflation:

• The 3.6 trillion rubles allocated to regions in 2026 have significantly reduced their real purchasing power compared to 2021
• Currently, more than two-thirds of Russian regions are in fiscal deficits
• In areas of industrial decline such as Kemerovo, the local government has been forced to cut children’s summer activities
• Public debt is close to 42% of annual income

This financial pressure is directly reflected in the decline of infrastructure:

• In the provinces outside Moscow, public housing maintenance has stalled
• Garbage piles up
• Utility (water, electricity, gas) costs have risen year after year

For ordinary people, “wartime prosperity” is only reflected in numbers, while the living environment, transportation convenience, and community service quality of daily life are deteriorating rapidly.

Systemic degradation of the health and education system

As the core of the country’s human capital, Russia’s medical and education systems are undergoing a transformation from “modernization” to “maintaining the status quo” and even “ideological” in a war environment.

The supply and demand crisis of medical services

The medical system is being oppressed by three mountains: personnel shortages, drug outages, and aging equipment:

• At the end of 2023, Russia is short of about 2.65 doctors and 6 intermediate medical staff
• In Velikinovgorod, with a population of 22, there are fewer than 10 ambulance squads operating
• Healthcare workers are leaving their jobs en masse due to low pay and overwork

Reduced Drug Accessibility:

• Although medical supplies are not on the sanctions list, the withdrawal of foreign companies and soaring logistics costs have led to an 11% reduction in drug types
• Sales of key imported drugs such as insulin fell to a five-year low
• The quality of homegrown generic drugs is often disputed

Disease prevention collapse:

• Due to vaccine shortages and declining vaccination rates, the incidence of infectious diseases such as measles and whooping cough has skyrocketed hundreds of times in 2023

Education threshold and compulsory labor:

• To fill the loophole, the government has significantly increased medical school tuition fees
• Mandatory rural service requirements for graduates have been strengthened

Ideology and military infiltration of education

The education system in Russia has become an extension of state propaganda. The reforms in the 2024-2025 school year mark the full implementation of “sovereign education”:

Militarization of the course:

• The new subject, Homeland Security and Defense Fundamentals, replaces security education
• The course content includes gun dismantling and drone operation

Reshaping Historical Perspectives:

• Unified high school history textbooks have added a lot of content about “special military operations”
• Picture Russia as the last bastion against the “decadent West”

Deteriorating Campus Atmosphere:

• Teachers are forced to convey official ideology in weekly “conversations about important matters”
• Teachers and students who refuse to participate or make anti-war remarks will be reported or even expelled

8. Restrictions on life under digital sovereignty: internet disconnection and surveillance

Russia, once proud of its digital transformation, will enter the era of “digital disruption” in 2025. In order to prevent drone attacks and control the flow of information, the government has begun to cut off the Internet at the physical level.

Normalized mobile internet shutdown

Since May 2025, there have been about 2,000 regional mobile Internet outages in Russia every month. People in affected areas have had to return to their original way of life:

Payment system paralysis:

• Since card machines and online payments rely on mobile networks, only cash can be used for purchases during the disconnection
• This led to a fivefold increase in demand for cash in Russian society by the end of 2025

Degradation of public services:

• People were told to re-use land phones to request a ride
• Download offline maps

The injustice of the “whitelist”:

• The government-established whitelist system, which only allows access to state-run media and government websites, fails frequently

Digital Surveillance and VPN War

• The Russian Communications Regulatory Agency (Roskomnadzor) has blocked more than 439 VPN services
• Interception is implemented at the protocol level through deep packet inspection (DPI) technology
• The new IMEI database legislation strengthens the tracking of personal devices, further restricting citizens’ digital freedoms

Variation in the consumer market: from the era of brands to the era of survival

Sanctions and the collective withdrawal of Western companies have completely rewritten the consumption list of the Russian population.

Brand shortage and quality downgrade

While Russians claim to “don’t miss IKEA or McDonald’s”, the decline of parallel imports in reality is limiting options:

• Parallel imports are expected to decline by 45% to 50% in 2025
• Because the government is trying to force immature “import substitution”

Automotive Market:

• European, American, Japanese and Korean brands are almost extinct
• Chinese cars occupy half of the country
• The price of new cars has more than doubled compared to before the war

Basic material inflation:

• As mentioned earlier, the prices of basic foods such as potatoes will soar by 173-183% in 2024-2025
• It directly hits the bottom line of survival of low-income families

Deep tearing of regions and hierarchies

The war is reshaping Russia’s social geography and wealth map. This reshaping is not based on productivity advancements, but on the trade-off between “life costs” and “military premiums”.

The rise of poor areas under the “economics of death”

For remote and impoverished areas such as Buryatia and Tuva, the war has become a kind of cruel “social elevator”:

Vertical Transfer of Wealth:

• Federal funds poured into these areas that traditionally lacked financial savings through high signing bonuses and “coffin money” (death benefits).

Asymmetry in mortality:

• War mortality in poor areas differs by orders of magnitude compared to Moscow
• Studies have shown that residents of Tuva and Chukochka are 25 times more likely to die in the war than Muscovites

Dependency Trap:

• The “prosperity” of these regions depends entirely on military grants
• Once the conflict ends, these regions will face more severe population desertification and structural poverty than before the war

Extreme hierarchical polarization

Despite the official emphasis on “national unity”, the gap between the rich and the poor within the country has reached a record high:

Top Predator:

• 1% of Russia’s population holds about 70% of the country’s assets
• 5% of the population has 80%

War beneficiaries:

• The wealth of management and senior officials of military enterprises is growing rapidly
• The number of billionaires increased from 100 to 146 in one year
• Moscow will have 90 billionaires in 2025, an increase of 16 from a year ago, second only to New York

Fragile “majority”:

• 38% of Russians have no savings at all
• Another 24% can only sustain themselves for a month or two without losing their income
• This means that most people lack any buffer against inflation

Psychosocial evolution and the crisis of legitimacy of rule

The psychological state of the Russian people has undergone a transformation from initial panic and despair to the current “normalization” in three years.

The paradox of pleasure and psychological defense

A 2025 survey showed that 57% of Russians claim to be satisfied with their lives. This data reflects a deep psychological defense mechanism: treating war as “background noise” and finding solace in microscopic private life.

However, behind this “adaptive happiness” is the collective degradation of social morality and the complete abandonment of public affairs.

Although Putin presented an image of controlling everything at the press conference, the audience message briefly flashed on the background screen revealed public dissatisfaction:

• “This is not a live hotline, this is a circus”
• “Looking at the living conditions in the country, the United Russia Party has been winning, it’s really strange”

The reshaping and hidden crisis of the legitimacy of regime rule

As the war enters its fourth year, the Russian government’s ruling strategy has shifted from a “prosperity contract” to a “wartime survival contract”:

Militarization of sources of legitimacy turns:

1. Managed Present: Instead of providing the people with a long-term vision of development, Putin offers a “managed present” characterized by war, resource mobilization, and confrontation with the West

2. Legalization of “Deathonomics”: The government institutionalizes mercenaries and war death subsidies, incorporates the criminal culture and poor classes that originally belonged to marginalized groups into the system, and exchanges compensation for the silence of the people about the loss of life

3. Supersuppression and Ideological Rule: The regime relies on “supersized repression” - that is, using severe sentences such as the National Security Law and treason to eliminate all organized opposition, and instills extreme nationalism and military worship in the next generation through “sovereign education”

Hidden systemic crises

Despite the apparent stability, multiple deep crises are on the verge of erupting:

Debt and Inflation Spiral:

• After reaching a record high of 21% at the end of 2024, the benchmark interest rate began to be gradually lowered to 16.5% in early 2025, but it is still well above pre-pandemic levels
• High interest rates make it impossible for private businesses to raise funds
• The problem of late payments has surged, and a “non-payment chain” between enterprises is forming

Real Estate and Financial Risks:

• With the end of the subsidized loan policy, the largest real estate developers, such as Samolet, are at risk of bankruptcy
• This could trigger a chain financial crisis similar to 2008

Irreversible loss of human capital:

• Chronic labor shortages and the loss of educated elites
• This means that even if the war ends tomorrow, the Russian civilian economy has lost its basic impetus to return to the modernization track
• The Russian Academy of Sciences predicts that by 2030, the labor gap will reach 240 to 480 people
• In the worst case, it could be as high as 11 million

Conclusion

A 20-year-old soldier died on the front line, but 73-year-old Putin talked about love at a press conference. This absurd contrast is a true portrayal of today’s Russian society.

War brings not only the loss of life, but also the exhaustion of the development potential of the entire country:

• **Massive loss of labor force (**65-100 high-skilled talents immigrate, 100 soldiers casualties)
• The medical education system has deteriorated (2.65 million doctors are in short supply, and the incidence of infectious diseases has skyrocketed hundreds of times)
• Decline in the quality of public services (two-thirds of the regions have fiscal deficits, infrastructure has stagnated)
• Social class polarization intensifies (1% of the population owns 70% of assets, 38% of the population has zero savings)
• Food safety crisis (potato prices soared by 183%, one-third of the people faced food difficulties)

The ostensible economic growth figures (GDP growth of 3.6%-4.3% in 2023-2024) cannot hide the structural recession. What is even more worrying is that this “wartime boom” is entirely dependent on unsustainable military spending (defense and security spending will account for 46% of the budget in 2026):

• The cost of war is $5-10 billion per day
• $2500 billion in direct military spending
• $2000 billion in extrabudgetary financing

Once the war ends, Russia will face an even worse economic and social crisis than before the war:

• GDP growth forecast fell from 4.3% to 0.8-1.5% (2025-2026)
• The labor gap will reach 240-11 million people (by 2030)
• Real estate and financial system collapse risk
• Irreversible loss of human capital

Historians may remember the day December 19, 2025 — not because Putin admitted to being in love at a press conference, but because at that moment, the leader of a country could talk about love so easily while his country was paying a heavy price for a war with no end in sight.

Sources

1. International Organizations:

• International Monetary Fund (IMF)
• World Bank
• Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

2. Official Russian agencies:

• Russian Federal Statistical Service (Rosstat)
• Bank of Russia
• Ministry of Agriculture of Russia
• Ministry of Economic Development of Russia

3. Research Institutions:

• OSW - Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich
• Development Center of the Higher School of Economics (Russia)
• Russian Academy of Sciences
• Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

4. News and analysis sources:

   • The Moscow Times
   • Meduza
   • Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
   • Euromaidan Press
   • Bloomberg
   • Trading Economics
   • The Ins (theins.ru)

5. Industry Organizations:

• Potato Union
• Russian Grain Union
• AB-Center (Agricultural Analysis Company)

6. Special Research:

• OutRush Research Project (Migration Studies)